

CLEARSY


Safety Solutions Designer

APR 2025

AIX
LYON
PARIS
STRASBOURG

WWW.CLEARSY.COM

Safety railway engineering and products CLEARSY



CONTACT@CLEARSY.COM

Independent French Company

- ▶ Created in 2001 by **the team authors of the ATELIER B**, famous formal method tool
- ▶ **Independent from any customer and owned by French ICE Group, founders and employees**
- ▶ 2023 turnover: **20 M€, 160 engineers & PhDs**
- ▶ **20% abroad**: Brazil, Chile, Luxembourg, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Macao, Japan, USA, Canada, Italy ...
- ▶ **Partnership with Paris metro (RATP)** to develop and deploy innovative custom safety solutions
- ▶ Partnership with factories to provide industrial equipment and local companies for exportation/distribution



We are designer

CLEARSY Offer

Range of safety critical systems designed by CLEARSY - Products

- ▷ Supply of **safety systems already developed and in revenue service**
- ▷ Adaption of existing systems to specific requirements

Safety critical systems design

- ▷ Design of **turn-key safety critical systems** (hardware and software) certified SIL2 to SIL4
- ▷ Prototype of safety critical system and proof of concept

Safety critical software design

- ▷ Usage of **the B formal method to develop safety critical software** and to **prove system specifications**: formal specification and code verification
- ▷ Support for the software development toolkit: Atelier B, used by Alstom and Siemens to develop ATP safety critical systems
- ▷ Design of supervision and simulation systems
- ▷ Safety critical data validation

ERTMS/ETCS CLEARSY Offer

In-depth knowledge of ERTMS/ETCS:

- ▷ SUBSET 026, ERA DMI specification
- ▷ DMI development (SIL0, SIL2)
- ▷ Track plan editor
- ▷ EVC development

In-depth expertise in Simulation and Testing:



- ▷ Training
- ▷ Testing (SUBSET 094, SUBSET 110/111/112)
- ▷ Train behavior simulation
- ▷ Trackside simulation (IXL, RBC, ...)

Available tools developed by CLEARSY:

- ▶ **ETCS operational simulator**
- ▶ **ETCS traffic simulator – Track plan editor**
- ▶ **ETCS RBC test bench**
- ▶ **ETCS on-board unit test bench (EVC)**
- ▶ **Multi-platform DMI software**
- ▶ **Safety critical data validation software**

Available product developed with CENTRALP:

- ▶ **A SIL2 DMI**



ERTMS/ETCS

25 years of experience

More than 20 years of Experience – since the very beginning of ERTMS

- ▶ Founded as part of the former **ERRI** (European Railway Research Institute – financed by the UIC – International Union of Railways) to develop the first ETCS simulator for the **project A200**.
- ▶ Our first mission: **translate complex details of Technical Specifications for interoperability (TSI) into a suite of tools for training and testing equipment**

Reference in ERTMS

- ▶ Developed the **first ETCS simulator**
- ▶ **UNISIG** asked us to develop the first test bench for on-board systems
- ▶ The test bench was delivered to **CEDEX**, then **DLR** and **MULTITEL**, **3 well-known ERTMS laboratories in Europe that certify systems are compliant with TSIs**
- ▶ Helps the **ERA** (European Railway Agency) and the **ERTMS Users Group** in the consolidation of the specifications of Baseline 3
- ▶ Today, our set of tools is still helping companies **to develop and test their new ERTMS systems and train their collaborators**

UNISIG



Our Expertise

Standards for railway safety critical systems

- ▷ **CENELEC** standards: EN 50126, EN 50128 and EN 50129
- ▷ **AREMA**

Urban line – Metro and Light Rail

- ▷ **CBTC** (Communication Based Train Control): worked with the main suppliers on their Automatic Train Operation (ATO), Automatic Train Protection (ATP) and Automatic Train Supervision (ATS). Experienced with GoA2 to 4 operation
- ▷ **Signaling** - Realized several interlocking systems based on PLC and relays

Main line – Regional trains and commuters

- ▷ **ERTMS** (European Rail Traffic Management System)
- ▷ **Signaling** - Realized several interlocking systems based on PLC and relays

Railway clients and partners



Design and implementation of certified safety critical systems and software



Reference : 9111/1001 édition 1

CERTIFER certifie que le système de management mis en place par:
CERTIFER certifies that the management system implemented by:

CLEARSY System Engineering
320, avenue Archimède, Les Pleiades 3 – Bâtiment A
13857 AIX-EN-PROVENCE Cedex 3, France

Pour les activités suivantes :
For the following activities:

Conception et développement de systèmes de contrôle-commande, de logiciels sécuritaires et de produits - activités de conseil

Design and Implementation of safety critical control-command systems and software – Consulting
a été évalué et jugé conforme aux exigences requises par :
has been assessed and found to meet the requirements of:

ISO 9001 : 2015

et est déployé sur les sites suivants :
and is developed on the following locations:

320, avenue Archimède, Les Pleiades 3 – Bâtiment A
13857 AIX-EN-PROVENCE Cedex 3, France

62, rue de la Chaussée d'Antin
75002 PARIS, France

10 rue des Emeraudes, 69006 LYON, France

1 rue des cigognes, 67100 STRASBOURG, France

Date de délivrance initiale : 10/03/2024
Date of certification

Date de fin de validité : 09/03/2027
Date of end of validity

Délivré à Valenciennes le 10/03/2024
Issued in Valenciennes on

Le Directeur Général
The Managing Director

Ana Paula BOUCHEREAU



CERTIFER FRANCE : 18 rue Gérard Mercator - 59100 Valenciennes - Tél. : +33 (0)3 27 28 25 00 - www.certifer.fr
Statut par Adhésion Temporaire au capital de 7 500 000 € - TVA Intr. : FR00 501 128 632 000 01 - APE : 7320B - RCS Valenciennes 852 100 022

Usage of B formal method

Formal software development of ATP (CBTC)

- ▷ SIL4 sub-system Design, software Development, Verification & Validation
- ▷ ALSTOM (Urbalis), SIEMENS (Trainguard)

Property-based formal system verification for authorities

- ▷ MTA (New York City) for CBTC
- ▷ SNCF for ERTMS level 2 and Hybrid Level 3
- ▷ RATP for CBTC

Property-based formal software verification

- ▷ ALSTOM, SIEMENS, THALES, RATP

Formal data validation

- ▷ ALSTOM, RATP, SNCF, THALES, ATOS, SIEMENS, SETEC



Property-based formal system verification

Safety verification of the CBTC of NYCT

NYCT entrusted us to demonstrate system properties are compliant with specifications and which assumptions need to be verified to ensure safety of daily operation

► Save time


- ▷ Address every design detail in the early phase

► Enhance Safety

- ▷ Define sufficient tests which need to be passed before daily operation
- ▷ Define tests for acceptance of subcomponents

► Less dependent

- ▷ Ease subcomponents integration thanks to a model of the system.
- ▷ Less dependent to one supplier



This organisation was used for the NYCT project

System : Method for **verifying the CBTC of the line 7 in New York**, for CBTCs for Paris metro (RATP), for ERTMS for SNCF (Marseille Vintimille ETCS HL3)

Software : **ALSTOM, RATP**

Formal data validation

Ensure safety critical data/system parameters are correct

Safety critical software applications are developed and validated independently and each part must be safe at the same level: SIL4


CLEARSY proposes a **data validation tool** and its associated services.

Advantages:


- ▶ It is **fast**: a couple of hours is enough for validating a complete railway project. This speed can never be matched by human verification.
- ▶ It is **automatic, exhaustive**, push-button and **repeatable at will** (it avoids fastidious non-regression phase, easy iteration phases).
- ▶ It removes human errors, as it makes use of **certified formal techniques**.
- ▶ It allows a **strong reuse** from one project to another (capitalization of the knowledge and the generic rules database).
- ▶ It is **T2 certified** (including ProB engine) for SIL4 project regarding Cenelec EN 50128.
- ▶ Targets = CBTC, Mainline, Interlocking, ...

Formal data validation principles

T2 for SIL4 tool



CLEARSY has deployed its systems worldwide



Automatic train stop

Deployed in Valenciennes, Nice, Lyon (France) and Baku in Azerbaijan, in deployment in Corsica France

Overspeed control system

Deployed in Paris (France) and Baku (Azerbaijan)

PSD Control systems

Deployed in Paris (France), Stockholm (Sweden), Sao Paulo (Brazil), Caracas (Venezuela), Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), in deployment in Brisbane (Australia)

Track intrusion detection system

Deployed in New York (USA) and in Paris (FRANCE)

Safety remote I/O network (SIL0, SIL2 and SIL4)

In deployment in North America

Supervision system

Deployed in Paris, Grand Paris (France) and Honolulu (USA)

RS4 safety critical relays (SIL4)

Deployed in France, Luxembourg, Singapore, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, USA ...

Autonomous Platform Screen Door opening and closing systems

COPPILOT &
DOF Systems

- ▶ Independent from any train control systems (ATC or only ATP) and signaling
- ▶ Can be installed on existing and new line, existing and new trains with existing or new train control system
- ▶ Connected to PSD controller

SOLUTIONS FOR

Metro authorities

- ▷ Driverless turnback project
- ▷ PSD tests
- ▷ PSD operation before commissioning of a new ATC*
- ▷ Mixed operation during ATC deployment (new and old train mixed)
- ▷ Backup system to control PSD

PSD supplier

- ▷ Turnkey PSD project:
 - ➔ Including safety critical control system on existing and new line
 - ➔ Compatible with any types of PSD and interfaces (half, semi-full, full height)

ATC supplier

- ▷ PSD control managed independently of the ATC

*ATC: Automatic Train Control like CBTC, ETCS,...

SIL3 platform screen doors control system with onboard equipment

DOF System

PSD opening authorization when the train stops in the tolerance zone and train doors are opening


Onboard

1 Control Unit + 1 Sensor, per active cabin

Wayside

1 Antenna per stopping point

1 Control Unit per platform



SIL3: Door opening control (SIL4 on demand)

SIL4: Correct train side doors enable

Proven product already in use

Paris Metro Line 1 (four years of operation), in operation on Line 13 and 4

- DOF is independent from the CBTC system
- CBTC doesn't manage the PSD



Upgraded version of DOF for Brisbane Metro

- Doors selectivity: each opposite PSD and train doors are synchronized
- Opening adapted to different train lengths
- LAN connectivity and relays interface : Interfaced with PSD controller and train network




DOF System



SIL3 PSD control system with only wayside equipment

COPPILOT
System

PSD opening authorization as: the train stops in the tolerance zone and the train doors are opening



- ▶ **No equipment on-board** only on the wayside
- ▶ Head and tail lasers ensure: correct train positioning and zero train speed
- ▶ 2 doors lasers detect: opening and closing of train doors managed by train operator
- ▶ **Based on SIL4 control unit**

Easy-to-install on new and existing stations

COPPILOT
System

- ▶ In service in **Sao Paulo Metro** : **Tamanduatei, Vila matilde, Sacoma, Vila prudente** (1st project in South America), deployment on lines 1, 2, 3
 - 2024: 7 stations in service and 2 more under deployment
 - 143 trains shared on 3 lines, 7 train types : impossible to install equipment on-board
 - Metro wanted an **auxiliary SIL3 system** to control PSD. COPPILOT was selected and became the main system to compensate late CBTC delivery...
 - **Driverless turnback project**
- ▶ A monorail version in test for **Sao Paulo Monorail** line 15. It was upgraded for monorail application (SIL4). 13 stations will be equipped
- ▶ In service for 9 months in **Paris** during the **PSD test period**
 - COPPILOT was chosen to manage 3 PSD from 3 different manufacturers of mechanical PSD on 3 platforms. RATP did not want any installation on the 65 trains during the test
- ▶ In service in **Stockholm**: 6 platforms in operation (2 stations)
 - Additional functions: PSD individual opening, 2 trains lengths, platform berthing guidance, two way trains, and can handle 2 berthing positions
 - Adaption of PSD opening widths to where the train stopped for optimal train access




SIL3 platform gap safety monitoring system

DIL System


GAP SAFETY MONITORING

- ▶ In operation in PARIS line 1, deployment in PARIS on Line 4, safety critical system
- ▶ System to detect a person in the gap zone between platform door and train door



Laser sensors monitoring gaps

Monitoring these spaces (DIL system)



Bastille station in Paris



- ▶ Lasers are also used to detect people who try to escape into the tunnel
- ▶ In revenue service in 3 stations in Parisian network: Charles de Gaulle Etoile, Nation and Bastille
- ▶ In revenue service on Paris line 4


Flexible gap filler

between platform and door edge on Paris&Lyon metro lines

- ▶ Gap filler prevents accidental fall if a person steps between platform and train
 - ▷ Fixed on the platform
 - ▷ Rubber material - Flexible

Already in Service

- ▶ Paris metro lines 1&4
- ▶ Lyon lines A&B



Track intrusion detection system, *Tested in New York City (MTA)*

Detects falling passenger onto the tracks

► Laser

Pictures are analysed to discern an object as a rodent or a human

Accuracy is crucial:
To avoid false positive alarms

► Alarm and Strobeoscope

They are activated to warn the train officer in the case of a person falling onto the tracks




Similar systems already in service in:

- ▷ **Lyon:** based on Infrared
- ▷ **Nuremberg:** based on radar
- ▷ **Budapest:** based on radar

To detect platform and measure gap between train and platform (SIL2)

All system components are mounted on board

ALSTOM



Gap filler

Is deployed to just fill the gap which is measured by the laser scanners

1

Laser scanners

Measure gap between train and platform

2

Controller

Will authorise the car doors to open or/and the gap filler to move if platform is present in front of doors


3



operating on ALSTOM Train STI PMR

Automatic Train Stop (ATS) – SIL2

KFS &
KPVA Systems



- 1 Train operator is in charge of stopping the train when there is a restrictive signal and is responsible of the speed of the train
- 2 Emergency brake is applied if train overruns a restrictive signal


KFS must be **HIGHLY AVAILABLE** and that's why SIL2 is enough.

Ex: ATS system of Paris commuter trains is SIL0

KPVA measures **instantaneous speed of trains** at defined point of the line and applies **emergency brake in case of overspeed**.

Automatic Train Stop (ATS) – SIL2

KFS System



Railway - CENELEC

EN 50128 - EN 50129

BUREAU VERITAS

Certification




Deployed in:

Valenciennes, Nice, Lyon Tramway –
France – and Baku Metro – Azerbaijan
In deployment in Corsica

Speed control by section

KFSV

- ▶ Beacons installed on the track communicate the speed limits to the controller on board.
- ▶ Controller compares the speed limit to the train speed. In case of overspeed: **it applies emergency brake**




Track vacancy detection - hyper frequency barrier

In Research & Development

Alternative to steel wheel sensor: when a train crosses the barrier, it is detected.

- ▶ SIL4 system
- ▶ Hyper frequency technology
- ▶ Less maintenance than infrared sensor:
better availability
- ▶ Fit for outdoor and indoor applications
- ▶ Plug and play system: system is very compact



tested in Lyon

SIL4 certified vital relays

RS4



RS4 vital relay features:

- ▷ Normally Open contacts guaranteed to open with a **Safety Integrity Level 4***
- ▷ **Weld no transfer contacts**
- ▷ Fit **onboard and trackside application** (vibration, shock, environment,...)
- ▷ Sealed contacts to assure **making contact at low current** (4mA at 1 VAC and 1VDC)
- ▷ **DIN mounted or 3U**
- ▷ **Small size and light weight**

REFERENCES	SIL4 NO CONTACTS	NC CONTACTS
RS4.DIN.202.24V	2	2
RS4.3U.202.24V	2*2 (2 relays 202)	2*2
RS4.DIN.304.24V	3	4
RS4.DIN.402.24V	4	2
RS4.DIN.406.24V	4	6
RS4.DIN.202.110V	2	2
RS4.B.24.0.24	24 contacts right and left	



Relay 3U card packaging



DIN packaging, Relays



Latching interface system
24 NC and 24 NO contacts
6U card packaging


*SIL4: Probability of the NO contacts not opening is of 10⁻⁸ per hour

RS4 vital relay applications

- ▶ Safety interface relay for SIL4 PLC
 - ▷ Inputs and outputs
 - ▷ Galvanic isolation of 2kV (AC)
- ▶ Closed and locked signal contacts commanded by door control unit of platform screen doors
- ▶ Safety relay for onboard applications
 - ▷ Control train traction circuit breaker




LUXTRAM - Luxembourg tramway ▲



RS4 controls circuit breakers ▶

Vital latching interface system

Legacy System



Revenue
service-Day Tests-Night



New System



Wayside Devices



More than 200 Contacts



Safety remote I/O network (SIL0, SIL2, SIL4) SATURN

Reducing wiring for onboard or trackside application

- ▶ Replace wiring by a safety network
- ▶ Non standard open source communication protocol
 - EN50159 compatible protocol
- ▶ Different safety level modules on the same network
- ▶ Industrial network response time: 10 to 15 ms
- ▶ Data rates: 12 Mbits/s over 100 m
- ▶ 3U packaging
- ▶ Up to 512 Inputs/Outputs
- ▶ Partnership with: Leroy Automation



CLEARSY Safety Platform

Low-Cost safety execution platform for SIL4 application

- ▶ A **complete software development environment** based on **formal language** (B mathematical language) and using a double compilation chain (certified T3)
- ▶ A **computing platform** that **natively integrates safety principles** (5cm x 8cm)
- ▶ A **safety controller** : 3U rack including 4 Inputs / 3 Outputs and 1 ETHERNET base 10/100 TX
- ▶ **Starter kit** : non safety mother board 32 I/O



Ease development of SIL4 certified systems and software

Drastically reduce the time and effort to certify (80%), SIL4 generic certificate supplied


Drastically reduce costs associated with their development



DAME

Railway custom SCADA

- ▶ **Custom SCADA for small and large applications or systems: flexible architecture**
- ▶ **Extend on demand the range of supported devices and protocols**
- ▶ **Interface with SCADA available on the market: *data preparation, component status***
- ▶ **Real-time supervision of large complex systems (PLC, digital I/O devices, ...)**
- ▶ Real-time calculation and alarms triggering
- ▶ Collecting and archiving of input data
- ▶ Archiving of **alarms**
- ▶ Provides data and alarms in HMI, Modbus, OPC



RATP line 1 on 3 stations (DIL): PLC and laserscan data

Sao Paulo Monorail line 15 (COPPILOT): Modbus IP, Laser sensors data, video (13 stations)

Caracas Los Teques line (6 stations) (COPPILOT): PLC, Modbus IP server (export to SCADA)

Honolulu Line (21 stations): I/O board, RS485 (ATC), Modbus RTU (Doors Control Unit)

SIL2 centralized supervision system of fire safety systems




- ▶ Forwards fire safety data (status of alarms and equipment) **from stations to the command centre**
- ▶ Examines fire safety equipment and its own system status
- ▶ Informs officers in charge of fire safety, on a real-time basis about any events occurring on the supervised network.
- ▶ Supplies the operating system with all the **data necessary for the first inspection prior emergency procedure**
- ▶ **Remotely controls in SIL2 (IEC 61508 (edition 2) – Parts 1 to 4), the safety devices on site**
- ▶ Continuously controls data validity (alarms, command execution)



Supervision system certified, approved and interoperable

- Suitable to supervise fire systems of **public-access buildings**
- Approved by **the CNPP**, the French association for risk prevention and control (article GA44.2) and Certified **SIL2**
- **Interoperable**: work on hardware from any manufacturer
- **Flexible**: can be interfaced with many different fire safety systems

In deployment in **Paris Metro (RATP)**: it centralizes supervision of all fire safety systems of the Paris metro network, and in **“Grand Paris”**, the extended commuter and metro network of Paris area



Complete SIL2 DMI and SIL2 associated generic platform

- ▶ Baseline 3 ETCS DMI Based on a **generic SIL2 platform**
- ▶ The specific customer HMI application can be added and doesn't change the certificate
- ▶ DMI manages safety features according CENELEC SIL2
- ▶ EN 50126 (RAMS), EN 50128 (Software), EN 50129 (Hardware)
- ▶ SUBSET 026 v 3.6.0 chapter 4.7 / ERA specification v 3.6.0 / SUBSET 091 v 3.6.0
- ▶ Baseline 4 under development



Certification



Software developed by **CLEARSY**

Hardware developed by **CENTRALP**

CENTRALP
Embedded electronic systems

ETCS operational and traffic simulator

Operational simulator

Build a real-time visualization of a train running under ERTMS supervision

- ▶ Predefined track side messages
- ▶ Simulated RBC messages
- ▶ Standalone
- ▶ ETCS Baseline 2 to Baseline 4
- ▶ First version in 2005
- ▶ Running on Linux



Traffic simulator

Build a detailed engineering model of a complete railway running under ERTMS

- ▶ First version released in 2002
- ▶ Simulators for all parts of ERTMS:
 - ▷ IXL, RBC, Automatic route setting, Trains
- ▶ Can include multiple OPSIMUs w/o 3D
- ▶ ETCS Baseline 2 to Baseline 4





Traffic Simulator

ETCS On-board unit test bench

Testing of industrial on-board units

- ▶ First version in 2001 (EMSET EU project)
- ▶ Interfacing via SUBSET-094
- ▶ Baseline 2 to Baseline 4



ETCS RBC test bench

Testing of Radio Block Centre (RBC)

- ▶ First version in 2009
- ▶ Based on Traffic Simulator
- ▶ Trackside simulators replaced by industrial equipment
- ▶ Simulated trains
- ▶ Enables connection with OBU Test Bench
- ▶ Enables integration of SUBSET-111-2 to perform IOP tests (TVS)
- ▶ Baseline 2 to Baseline 4



RBC Test Bench hardware installed in a cabinet together with tested equipment

Contact

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- ▶ contact@clearsy.com
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13100 Aix-en-Provence
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